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Abstract
As personal information moves from home computers to mobile de-
vices, protection against information leaks and data theft becomes an
increasingly important and current issue. We develop a model-driven ap-
proach called IFlow which allows a developer to model mobile applications
with complex information flow properties using UML. Using model-to-
model and model-to-code transformations we generate code skeletons for
those applications and verify noninterference properties using a language-
based approach. Further, we will use those properties as lemmas for a
formal verification of an automatically generated formal representation of
the modeled application. In this report, we focus on automatic code gen-
eration, evaluation of language-based information flow control solutions
and deployment of generated code to target platforms.
1 Introduction
Smartphones, specifically third party smartphone applications constantly aggre-
gate personal user information like location, private photos or payment data. As
smartphones grow more popular and come to replace the personal computer for
many everyday tasks, information leaks become a major concern in the mobile
setting.
Protection of private data against leaks or misuse is becoming one of the
primary research targets in the industry and the academia. Enforcement of such
protection provided by mobile operation systems like Android is very limited
and does not guarantee safety of personal data. Combined with the variety of
unverified third-party applications on the official Android Marketplace, which
is the fastest growing software store to date [2] and a smartphone’s ability to
access the internet, this poses a serious threat to the privacy of the user and his
personal or corporate data.
Attacks and vulnerabilities which lead to personal data exfiltration or priv-
ilege escalation have already been shown in numerous research papers and also
discovered in the wild. Those can lead to unauthorized exposure of personal
data to advertisement networks, eavesdropping on phone calls or text messages
and data theft [8], and are usually utilized by malware. A selected example for
such malware is DroidDreamLight, which is actively used to trojanize legitimate
applications to then be reuploaded to the Android Marketplace [3]. However,
legitimate applications too can leak private data [8], albeit some might do so by
accident.
The IFlow project1 tackles the challenge of providing a development ap-
proach for designing applications, focusing on mobile Android apps, while giv-
ing formal guarantees about application-specific information flow (IF) proper-
ties. We believe that only by considering such security aspects early on during
the design phase one can achieve a satisfactory level of protection against data
leakage. Thus, we protect the developer against introducing unintended infor-
mation leaks, while also protecting the user of an application developed using
the IFlow approach against malicious developers.
This report focuses on the specifics of IF-secure application modeling and
source code generation from a practical point of view. The theory behind infor-
1This work is sponsored by the Priority Programme 1496 “Reliably Secure Software Sys-
tems - RS3” of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).
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Figure 1: IFlow model-driven approach
mation flow control as well as the description of the formal model and verifica-
tion will be given in another report. Section 2 gives an overview over the IFlow
approach, section 3 presents the IFlow modeling guidelines using our case study
as an example, while section 4 explains the automatic code generation utilizing
model-to-model and model-to-text transformations. Section 5 concludes this
report with a summary of achieved results and an outlook.
2 IFlow Approach
IFlow is a model-driven approach to develop secure applications with regard to
information flow as illustrated in Figure 1. It starts with an abstract UML model
of an application (1), which can include several applications communicating with
each other or a number of web services. This model utilizes a subset of standard
UML diagrams as well as IFlow UML profiles and is expanded with information
flow property annotations. Such annotations are used to express policies for
confidentiality of information by assigning security levels to information sources
or sinks. The modeling of actual functionality of applications and services is
kept abstract, allowing the developer to focus on high-level security properties
and agent communication.
The platform-independent IFlow UML model then undergoes several model-
to-model and model-to-text transformations to produce a formal model (2),
readable by the interactive verifier KIV [4], as well as an intermediate and a
platform specific model (PSM) for Java. This PSM is then used to generate a
Java code skeleton (3), which can be checked for illegal information flows by Jif
[17] or Joana [12]. The code skeleton can be completed manually by the devel-
oper in order to realize actual internal functionality of IFlow agents, checked
again with Joana for newly introduced information flows and then deployed on
an Android phone or a Java EE web service (4).
Since some application-specific information flow properties cannot be guar-
anteed using Joana, IFlow integrates the interactive theorem prover KIV in order
to prove such properties which extend beyond simple non-interference. This is
achieved by employing automatic model-to-text transformations to generate a
formal model using Abstract State Machines (ASM) representing the abstract
model of the IFlow application. After lifting non-interference properties checked
with Joana at the level of Java code to the formal model, the modeler is then
able to use them in order to prove additional properties with KIV. This is pos-
sible because of the 1:1 IF-preserving refinement relation between the formal
model and the skeleton code.
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Figure 2: Agent classes
3 Modeling IF-Secure Applications
3.1 Travel Planner Case Study
We explain the IFlow approach with the case study Travel Planner, which is a
travel booking system consisting of a travel agency service (TA) providing flight
offers to the user of a mobile travel planner (TP) application, developed by the
TA. The user is able to select a favored flight offer from a list of offers received
from the TA and pay for the flight ticket directly at the airline service using
the credit card data stored inside a credit card center application on his mobile
device. The TA then receives a commission from the airline. Secure information
flow within this system has to be ensured to provide the user with the guarantee
that his credit card data is only ever received by the intended airline, and only
after his explicit confirmation.
3.2 Static View
IFlow uses UML to model both static and dynamic views of an application,
which can consist of several application agents communicating with each other.
We use a class diagram to model smartphone applications, web services or user
interfaces, representing each of those agents with a UML class marked with a
Application-, Service- or User-stereotype from the predefined IFlow UML
profile. Agent class attributes denote data storage of the agent, with their data
types also modeled as classes within the class diagram. A Manual-stereotyped
class contains the signatures for all manual methods (i.e. methods that can later
be implemented manually by the developer in order to realize certain application
functionality) to be used in sequence diagrams for this application. Figure
2 shows an excerpt from the class diagram for the TravelPlanner case study,
picturing all involved agents2.
2The full model can be found in Appendix A and on our website, http://www.informatik.
uni-augsburg.de/lehrstuehle/swt/se/projects/iflow/
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Figure 3: (Excerpt of) message classes
The IF annotations are modeled as UML constraints on class attributes
to define their security level and establish a noninterference property (or sev-
eral). An annotation consists of a list of IFlow agents being able to observe
the annotated attribute. Figure 2 shows the User annotation applied to the
creditCardData-attribute of class CreditCardCenter, implying that only the
User agent is able to read it, while the attribute flightOffers of agent Airline
is annotated with the list User, TravelAgency, Airline, making flight offers es-
sentially public to all agents. Such annotations imply a lattice, with informa-
tion being able to flow only to equally or more restrictively annotated model
elements. Agent communication takes place by agents exchanging instances of
special message classes, defined by the modeler inside a class diagram by in-
heriting from an abstract class with the IFlow Message-stereotype (as seen in
Figure 3 and Figure 12) or predefined in an IFlow UML module (see Figure 14).
3.3 Dynamic View
Agent communication is modeled with sequence diagrams, with lifelines rep-
resenting communicating agents. IFlow sequence diagrams utilize a modified
version of the Model Extended Language (MEL)3 to express message instantia-
tions, method calls or local variable definitions. In order to fix the MEL syntax
and the subset of UML usable in IFlow models we defined a metamodel, which
is also used to instantiate intermediate IFlow models in the automatic model
transformations.
Sequence messages carry the name of appropriate message classes followed by
a list of parenthesized lifeline class attributes or local variables, which are used to
instantiate the message. The order of those variables is determined by the order
of attributes defined in the message class. Since non-primitive attributes of a
class are denoted with a named association, and UML class associations are not
ordered, we define the following guideline: if a class has exactly one association,
3The MEL language was initially designed for the SecureMDD project [15] in order to fully
express the functionality of an interactive agent in a UML activity diagram
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Figure 4: Booking a flight with an airline
Figure 5: Asking the user to choose an offer from a list
6
it is to be instantiated last. If a class has more than one association, the modeler
needs to define a class constructor with an ordered list of parameters carrying
the same name and type as instantiable class attributes.
The receiving lifeline is then able to access those variables or attributes.
Each message must be modeled to receive an answer message, while communi-
cation with a user is executed by sending a predefined user message to the user
lifeline. Messages received by the user lifeline are meant to represent a dialog-
or confirmation messages on the user interface. In order to increase the read-
ability and reusability of certain communication fragments, it is also possible
to reference other sequence diagrams by utilizing the UML Interaction Use
element pointing to the appropriate diagram. Each application task, modeled
as the communication between agents must begin with a IFlow-predefined user
message from a user lifeline to an application. Manual methods are modeled
as UML Self Messages; their return value can be assigned to an implicitly
declared variable and then be reused as input for other manual methods or as
part of a message to another agent.
Figure 4 shows an excerpt from the communication between the TP and
the airline, booking a flight by providing the airline with the ID of the flight
offer and the user’s credit card data. The assignment id := flightOffer.id
implies that the ID of the offer is being extracted from an attribute of a previ-
ously selected flight offer stored in the local variable flightOffer. The airline
can access the ID via the newly created local variable id of type Integer (as
implicitly derived from the type of the field flightOffer.id). It then calls
the manual method processBooking via a UML self-message; the method is
defined in the Manual class (see Figure 2) in order to process the booking of
the flight. It receives both the ID and the credit card data, since no manual
method can access local variables or attributes of its callee in order to prevent
the developer from introducing new information flows by reading or writing to
them.
We annotate each message between IFlow agents in order to specify the
security level of data any agent is able to receive. In Figure 4, each message is
annotated with {User, Airline}, which is more restrictive than the security
level of flight offers (see Figure 2) and therefore allows us to send a flight offer
ID to the airline. However, the user’s credit card data is even more restrictive,
which is why it has to be explicitly declassified prior to being sent. This is done
in a different sequence diagram after confirming the declassification with the
user (see Figure 18).
Figure 5 shows an interaction with the user, with the TP requesting the user
to select a flight offer from a previously received list of offers (see Figure 16). To
accomplish this, the TP sends the predefined user message GetSingleSelection
(see Figure 17) containing the list to the user interface. It answers with the user
message RetSingleSelection containing one element from the list. We model
the user selection with a generic attribute of the user class singleSelection,
which is assigned to an implicitly declared variable flightOffer upon receiving
of the answer by TP. Its type is derived from the type the elements in the sent
list, here FlightOffer.
To improve readability and modularity of sequence diagrams, we allow them
to reference each other via UML Interaction Use elements pointing to the
used diagram. We identify the initial diagram used to denote the beginning
of an interaction stretching over several sequences by sending a user message
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from the user lifeline to any IFlow application (Start message in Figure 15).
To access the sensors of a mobile device we will introduce several predefined
methods, to be used in sequence diagrams as self messages just as any man-
ual method. For now, we support the GPS sensor with the predefined methods
getCurrentGPSPos() and getAllGPSPos(); the first returns the current loca-
tion of the device, while the second provides the application with a list of all loca-
tions visited since it has been activated by the user. They have to be annotated
in order to identify the initial security level of this data. We support the declas-
sification of data by allowing MEL statements like y := declassify(x), which
declassifies data x and assigns it the declassification results to y. Such state-
ments have to be explicitly annotated with the source and target security levels
of the declassification, separated with an arrow (e.g. User->User,Airline in
Figure 18).
4 Mapping to Code
4.1 Motivation and Outline
The IFlow approach not only allows the developer to model an IF-secure appli-
cation, but also aids him with designing actual, deployable code for specific tar-
get platforms. We thus implement a transformation pipeline from the abstract
application model to code, using Java as our target code language. We delib-
erately omit application-specific implementation details in the abstract UML
model, focusing only on agent communication in order to simplify the model-
ing process, since such communication is generally enough to model IF. Thus,
our transformations automatically generate a code skeleton which implements
the agent communication and abstracts from actual application functionality by
invoking methods that are to be implemented manually by the developer.
Section 4.2 outlines the model transformation steps and routines required to
arrive at a Java code skeleton for an IFlow application. In order to check the
resulting Java code skeletons for illegal IF violating the modeled IF properties,
we employ a IF checking tool which operates on the language level. Section 4.3
describes our efforts in integrating the Jif IFC language into the IFlow approach,
while section 4.4 explains our plans to focus on Joana as an IFC checking tool. In
order to arrive at deployable code, the developer needs to implement the manual
methods, realizing application-specific functionality. As the resulting code base
needs to be checked for newly introduced IF leaks again, compartmentalized
and deployed to specific target platforms, IFlow utilizes an abstraction layer as
described in section 4.5. Our current target platforms are Android OS4 and
Java EE5, since Java is the native language for both those platforms, which is
a requirement for both considered IFC tools. Incidentally, Android is also the
top platform with a market share of 46.9% in the US [1], while the Android
Market is the fastest growing software store to date [2]. However, for most of its
applications, security or privacy of their users is not a primary concern, as seen
in a rising number of security reports on private data leakage (see e.g. [5, 8]).
4Android OS, a mobile platform by Google, http://www.android.com/
5Java Enterprise Edition, http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javaee/
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Figure 6: IFlow model transformation pipeline
4.2 Model Transformations
In order to produce deployable application code from an abstract UML model,
we introduce several intermediate meta-models in order to separate different
stages of model to code refinement. Figure 6 shows our model transforma-
tion pipeline, starting with the abstract model and ending with the Java code
skeleton, which must be manually enriched with the implementation of manual
methods in order to arrive at final code for each IFlow agent.
We use MagicDraw6 as our UML modeling tool, and the Eclipse IDE with its
modeling tools7 as our model transformation platform. In order to import the
MagicDraw UML model into our model transformation pipeline, the developer
has to export it as an Eclipse UML2 v2.x or v3.x XMI8 file, which is readable by
the Eclipse Modeling Tools framework. In order to simplify the invocation of the
several model transformation steps within Eclipse, we provide an Eclipse plugin
which adds a context menu for UML XMI files as well as all IFlow intermediate
models. This context menu allows to invoke the whole transformation pipeline
for the selected model, or any of the pipeline steps separately. The resulting code
is generated into a predefined Eclipse project and can be immediately edited
within the Eclipse IDE, e.g. in order to implement manual methods.
The first step of the IFlow model transformation pipeline is converting the
abstract UML model into an instance of the MEL-metamodel. This metamodel
is based on the MEL-language used in IFlow sequence diagrams; its instances
contain representations of each IFlow class and agent and define agent com-
munication interfaces as methods, including method bodies containing variable
declarations, assignments and calls to manual methods represented as typed
MEL syntax trees. Thus, every synchCall UML message in a sequence dia-
gram is mapped to a method with the same name and one parameter of same
type as the message. This method is declared inside the MEL class represent-
ing the IFlow agent which sent the message. The return type is determined by
the appropriate reply UML message from the receiving agent. Communication
with other agents within method body declarations is denoted with instances
of MEL-metamodel-objects Send- and Receive, which, in turn, contain a list of
sent or received variables; thus, each method body declaration begins with an
instance of a Receive element and concludes with a Send.
The transformation from a UML- to a MEL-model is implemented in Java
as an Eclipse plugin by creating a volatile Java representation of the abstract
6MagicDraw UML, https://www.magicdraw.com/
7Eclipse Modeling Project, http://www.eclipse.org/modeling/
8XMI: XML Metadata Exchange, http://www.omg.org/spec/XMI/
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Figure 7: Excerpt from the JAST metamodel
UML model prior to generating a MEL model, utilizing Eclipse EMF (Core)9 as
well as the ANTLR parser10 for parsing and annotating MEL expressions and
statements embedded in the abstract UML diagram as text.
MEL-models are still platform independent, thus the next step is transform-
ing such a model into an instance of a platform specific metamodel (PSM). We
defined a Java Abstract Syntax Tree (JAST) metamodel, which is capable of a
direct representation of the final Java code, and use it as our PSM metamodel
(excerpt from the JAST metamodel is shown in Figure 7); this model-to-model
transformation is implemented using QVTO11, which is part of the Eclipse EMF.
MEL classes representing IFlow classes and agents are being mapped to Java
classes (see Listing 1), while the MEL syntax tree is being transformed into a
Java syntax tree by translating each MEL statement to an appropriate Java
statement or expression.
Listing 1: QVTO-code implementing the mapping of a MELClass to a JAST
TypeDeclaration
1 mapping MELClass : : t rans formClass ( ) : J : : TypeDeclarat ion {
i n i t {
3 i n f o ( ” Creat ing c l a s s ” + s e l f . c lassname ) ;
var d e c l s : Sequence ( MethodDeclaration ) := s e l f . methoddecls−>
map trans fo rmDec la ra t i on ( ) ;
5 }
name := s e l f . c lassname ;
7 m o d i f i e r s += i f s e l f . i sAbs t r a c t then ’ ab s t r a c t ’ else null e n d i f ;
m o d i f i e r s += ’ pub l i c ’ ;
9 i s I n t e r f a c e := s e l f . i s I n t e r f a c e ;
name := s e l f . c lassname ;
11 c l a s s t y p e := classType ( s e l f . c lassname ) ;
i f ( s e l f . s u p e r c l a s s <> null ) then {
13 s u p e r c l a s s := classType ( s e l f . s u p e r c l a s s ) ;
debug ( ”\ t s u p e r c l a s s : ” + s e l f . s u p e r c l a s s )
15 } e n d i f ;
bodyDec larat ions += s e l f . a t t r i b u t e s−>c o l l e c t ( a | a . map
trans fo rmFie ld ( s e l f . c lassname ) ) ;
9http://www.eclipse.org/modeling/emf/?project=emf#emf
10ANTLR (ANother Tool for Language Recognition) parser generator, http://www.antlr.
org/
11Operational QVT, http://www.eclipse.org/m2m/
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17 bodyDec larat ions += d e c l s ;
}
The last model to code transformation step is pretty printing the actual Java
skeleton code from the JAST model of the IFlow application using XPand12.
The resulting code for the sequence diagram pictured in Figure 4 is given in
Listing 213.
Listing 2: Excerpt from Java-code implementing the sequence diagram shown
in Fig. 4
1 public OK bookFl ightOf f e r ( BookFl ightOf fer inmsg ) {
int id = inmsg . id ;
3 CreditCardData c c d d e c l = inmsg . ccd ;
Manual . processBooking ( id , c c d d e c l ) ;
5 return new OK( ) ;
}
In order to realize application-specific functionality, such as the function
filtering flight offers depending on user request data, the developer has to man-
ually implement it by replacing the automatically generated stub of the static
method filterOffers(...) in the Manual Java class.
4.3 IFC with Jif
In oder to check the generated code of IFlow applications for information flow
leaks, we considered using Jif14. Jif is a security-typed extension of the Java
programming language based on the Decentralized Label Model (DLM) theory
[16], a language-based approach to IFC. It allows the developer to create IF-
secure code by annotating it with Jif-specific language constructs and labels,
and would therefore seemingly fit into our IFlow approach. By generating Jif-
instead of Java-code and deriving Jif-labels from modeled IF-properties, the
IFlow developer could utilize the provided Jif compiler to check his application
for compliance with desired static IF policies, while the Jif runtime would enforce
those policies for the Java code produced by the Jif compiler dynamically. Jif
(and DLM theory in particular) were specifically designed for applications with
several participants who could all define their own security policies.
The Jif extension of Java seems lightweight; the developer is mainly re-
quired to provide security policies for application variables, classes, attributes
and method parameters; internally, each program statement is being labeled
by the Jif compiler as well. Such policies are called labels and have the form
{o1 → r1, r2; o2 ← w1, w2}, with o1, o2, r1, r2, w1, w2 denoting principals,
i.e. authority entities of the application. The developer specifies a lattice of
such principals, so that one principle may act for several others. In the example
above, o1 and o2 are the owners of the policy, r1 and r2 indicate the readers, w1
and w2 the writers of the policy. Labels also form a lattice, with principle read-
ers defining the confidentiality and writers the integrity of the annotated data
type; information may therefore only flow to equally or more restrictive program
12Xpand, http://www.eclipse.org/modeling/m2t/?project=xpand
13The full Java skeleton code for the Travel Planner application can be found at http://www.
informatik.uni-augsburg.de/lehrstuehle/swt/se/projects/iflow/. The skeleton code for
Travel Planner agents can be found in Appendix B.
14Jif: java + information flow, http://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif/
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statements and variables, e.g. a variable labeled with {o → r} is allowed to be
assigned to {o→} but not vice versa.
Obviously, any language-based IFC solution which aspires to be used in
real-world scenarios must support data declassification. Jif provides a built-in
declassify(e, L1 to L2) statement, which declassifies the provided data e from
security level L1 to L2. Each security level has one or several owners, and this
declassification statement can only succeed if called from within a class with the
assigned authority principle which is equal to or can act for all label owners.
Given the support for IFC provided by Jif, we considered it to be a viable
candidate for integration with the IFlow approach. We achieved the mapping
from abstract UML to Jif code by using the mapping to Java code as a basis
and enriching the resulting code with Jif annotations. We assumed each IFlow
agent to be a Jif principle, with all agents forming a flat IF lattice if none is
specified. As described in section 3, we applied security annotations to UML
class attributes, indicating their security level, as well as to messages within
IFlow sequence diagrams using UML constraints. We derived Jif labels from
those annotations by assuming a list of agents to be a list of Jif readers, omitting
the integrity and ownership aspects of Jif labels. We justify omitting the label
ownership by arguing that we model and check the whole application and thus
do not have an environment of mutual agent distrust as assumed by Jif. To
achieve this, we assume the owner of each label to be an automatically generated,
Default principle which each agent has the authority for, so that any agent is
able to declassify any given piece of data. The set of writers is assumed to be
empty, since we currently don’t consider case studies with integrity properties.
Security annotations from an IFlow class diagram can be mapped directly
to Jif labels for Jif class attributes. A Jif label derived from a sequence message
annotation can be assumed to be the method begin label (denoting the lower
bound for the security level of the callee program counter) as well as the label of
the argument of the method corresponding to this message. For a reply message,
the label is being applied to the return value of the Jif method. Declassification
annotations can be mapped directly to Jif declassification labels. The manual
methods of the application code can be implemented by the developer using Jif
code sans the declassify statement.
Using Jif policies we were able to express a non-interference application
property of our case study, namely “travel agency never learns the user’s credit
card data”15.
Listing 3: Excerpt from Jif-code implementing the sequence diagram shown in
Figure 4
public OK {Default−>User , A i r l i n e ;∗<−}
2 bookFl ightOf f e r {Default−>User , A i r l i n e ;∗<−} (
BookFl ightOf fer [{ Default−> ;∗<−}]{Default−>User , A i r l i n e ;∗<−}
inmsg ) {
4 int id = inmsg . id ;
CreditCardData c c d d e c l = inmsg . ccd ;
6 Manual . processBooking ( id , c c d d e c l ) ;
return new OK( ) ;
8 }
15The Jif skeleton code for a more complex version of our Travel Plannel case study including
ownership and integrity aspects and using slightly different model to code mapping passed
the IF check successfully
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Listing 3 shows the Jif code for the sequence diagram shown in Figure 4,
implemented using model to code mapping described in this report. As detailed
in subsection 4.2, sequence diagram messages are mapped to method calls; thus,
the BookFlightOffer-message is mapped to the method bookFlightOffer of
the Airline class. Owner of each label is a default principle, the list of writers
is empty.
The Jif code passed the IF check by the Jif compiler and verified our as-
sumptions of Jif being a viable IFC tool for IFlow. However, we did encounter
several problems which made us look for other alternatives. For one, the Jif
runtime environment is not yet implemented for Android, and it is thus not
possible to natively run Java code produced by the Jif compiler. However, as
Jif is only an extension of Java, it is possible to omit all Jif-specific language
constructs to arrive at valid Java code, which we manually verified for our case
study. This could be done automatically by either generating both Java and Jif
code (identical w.r.t. functionality and IF), checking the Jif code for IF leaks and
deploying the Java code, or implementing a dummy Jif runtime environment for
the Android platform; in both cases one loses the dynamical enforcement of IF
policies. It could also be possible to port the Jif runtime to Android.
The bigger problem is the overall complexity and unintuitive design of Jif
applications, as it has already been pointed out in other studies [11, 14]. Jif
applications require many explicit security annotations and exception case han-
dling (such as explicit NullPointerException-handling; also note the parame-
terizing of the BookFlightOffer-class with a Jif label in Listing 3, absent from
the model in Figure 4), which makes manual programming with Jif a painful ex-
perience; an experience a future IFlow modeler and developer would have to live
with when implementing manual methods. This also increases the complexity
and required maintenance efforts for IFlow model transformations. Further-
more, Jif offers little label inference capability while enforcing IF very strictly,
which results in many explicit security. Finally, the development of Jif seems
to have stagnated over the years, probably due to difficulties for the developer
listed above as well as little interest for the language outside of academic circles.
4.4 IFC with Joana
We identified Joana as a viable alternative for Jif as a IFC tool for Java ap-
plications and successfully evaluated it for our case study. The Valsoft/Joana
project16 aims to automatically construct precise program dependence graphs
(PDGs) for bytecode of moderately big Java applications (about 100kLOC [6]).
Such PDGs model the information flow within applications, as they show the
dependence between program statements w.r.t. IF, whereas each program state-
ment is represented by a PDG node and edges between nodes indicate the pos-
sibility of data or control flow between them. If no such edge between two nodes
exists, no information can flow between them; PDGs can therefore be used to
check Java application for information flow leaks [12]. Joana aids the developer
in finding such leaks by allowing him to provide an IF lattice and to identify
PDG nodes serving as sources or sinks of private information, effectively labeling
them with a security level. All other nodes inside the PDG are then being la-
beled automatically by Joana, following the rules of security level propagation.
16Valsoft/Joana project (KIT), http://pp.info.uni-karlsruhe.de/project.php?id=30
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Joana is then able to identify whether information from a source node ever
reaches a sink node with a lower or incompatible security level, violating the IF
policy. Joana also supports declassification by allowing the developer to mark
PDG nodes as declassification nodes, specifying the source and target security
levels. Generated PDGs can have too many edges due to analysis imprecisions,
but never too few; the IF analysis therefore could contain false positives, but
will not miss a possible IF leak.
A connection between the Gorguen/Meseguer-style noninterference and PDGs
has been established and proven [19]; it shows that statement c interferes a iff
there is a path from node c to a.
We found Joana to be a viable alternative to Jif, as it requires much less
effort from the modeler and the developer, allowing us to only generate Java code
instead of both Java and Jif. The actual analysis is performed on Java bytecode,
while the IF annotation is performed with the Joana tool and can easily be
automated. In [11, 12] the authors argue that the IF analysis using PDGs is more
precise than with Jif as well as easier, since the developer only has to annotate
the information sources, sinks and declassification statements. We evaluated
Joana by generating Java code for our case study using the mapping described
in previous chapters and omitting the Jif specific constructs. We annotated
the resulting bytecode with Joana using a lattice and security levels derived
from the abstract model, which can later also be automated using our model
transformations. To verify the security property of our case study “travel agency
never learns the user’s credit card data” we only needed four annotations (which
is even less we had to include in our model in order to derive security annotations
for the formal model and the Jif code), while the original Jif implementation
contained over a hundred label annotations to show that the same property
holds.
Joana annotations can be methodically derived from the IFlow security an-
notations by assuming each unique annotation to be a security domain and use
those to infer an IF lattice. Each annotated IFlow model element would there-
fore be a Joana source and a sink at the same time. Class attributes annotations
can thus be adapted directly, while message annotations could be applied to ei-
ther message classes or the appropriate method parameters respectively. IFlow
model transformations would also have to generate a unique declassification
method for each cross product of all security domains. Those can be anno-
tated as Joana declassification statements using the modeled source and target
security domains.
Notably, the Joana tool is currently unable to check the integrity aspects of
IF, which, however, is not a limitation for our project at this point, since our
case studies do not consider integrity properties. Furthermore, the Joana tool is
being actively developed and supported, and we are actively collaborating with
the Joana team within the scope of the RS3 priority programme. The current
version of Joana tool is very much work in progress, and we plan to contribute
to improving it.
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4.5 Deployment to Target Platforms
4.5.1 Motivation and Goals
As we have to generate Java code in order to employ automatic IF checking tools
like Jif or Joana, we chose Android as our target mobile platform, and Java EE
as the platform for IFlow services. Android is currently enjoying a growth in
popularity, with supported hardware ranging from smartphones to tablets to
even TVs running on Android. It employs several security mechanisms like
application sandboxing and an application permission system, which, however,
are not enough to protect the user’s private information stored on his device.
Reports on applications leaking confidential data like address books, phone IDs
and location data accidentally or on purpose to third parties appear frequently
in the media and academic papers (e.g. [8]). The main reasons for this is the
open nature of the Android application marketplace, with anyone being able
to submit his own application without prior security screening, as well as the
rather coarse-grained, inflexible permission system. A set of permissions defining
whether the application is allowed to access the internet, device sensors etc. is
determined by the developer and has to be approved by the user prior to the
installation of the application. However, application permissions do not define
which data can be sent over the internet, or how the application deals with
the sensor readouts; an application requiring both internet access and access
to the GPS sensor may use the location data to submit anonymized location
statistics to the developer, or leak the location of the user to any third party.
Besides, applications with seemingly harmless permissions can collaborate with
each other in order to create covert information flows in order to exfiltrate
confidential user information [13, 18].
With IFlow, we plan to address those shortcoming of the Android platform
by providing the developer with a model-driven software engineering approach
for IF-secure applications. We encourage him to focus on IF aspects of his
application in early development stages, not having to deal with implementation
details or rely on faulty Android security systems. By providing means to
verify IF properties and generate deployable, runnable code, our model-driven
approach is unique and goes beyond projects like XManDroid [7] or TainDroid
[9] (realtime privacy monitoring). This section will describe how we plan to
deploy automatically generated and manually enriched code to Android and
Java EE services.
4.5.2 Mapping to Platform Specific Code
In subsection 4.2 we described the mapping from the abstract UML model to
Java code skeletons. However, it is not trivial to translate those skeletons to
Android or Java EE specific code. Android applications have a unique structure
and rely on Android specific API; we thus need an intermediate abstraction level
between generated code and platform specific API. Furthermore, the generated
Java code is realized as a monolithic applications, with agent communication
implemented as Java class instances calling each other’s methods. This was done
to be able to analyze the code with IF checkers Jif and/or Joana, but such code
cannot be deployed to the target platform directly. We therefore implement a
wrapper library, which abstracts from platform-specific functionality like agent
communication implementation, device sensor or database access and provides
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Figure 8: Application communication using direct method calls for IFC checks
its own API, which we use in our generated code skeleton. The wrapper imple-
mentation has exchangeable versions. A prototype version calls agent methods
directly for communication and emulates database access in pure Java, while
a platform-specific version implements this functionality using platform-specific
API, to be used for deployment purposes.
Our modeling guidelines allow the modeler to access various mobile device
sensors via calls to predefined MEL methods, e.g. currentGPSPosition(). The
Java implementation of those methods also internally employs the wrapper li-
brary, which will either utilize the Android API or prototype method stubs
denoting the IF within those methods.
One challenge is to allow the developer to implement manual methods with-
out giving him the opportunity to introduce additional information flows, acci-
dentally or maliciously. The IFlow approach cannot expose the native platform
API to the developer, as it opens up many possibilities of potential information
leaks (e.g. directly opening a connection to a third party service from within a
manual method). We therefore only give the developer access to a subset of our
wrapper API, which is shown not to leak information, and forbid the usage of
declassification routines.
Another challenge of deploying the generated code to specific platforms is
agent to agent communication. Communication with the user interface is mod-
eled with sequence messages from a predefined set of user messages. An im-
plementation of this interface maps those messages to Android GUI elements
like input boxes or confirmation messages. Communication between apps and
services, modeled as direct method invocation, is routed through our wrap-
per library in the generated Java code (the wrapper API for this is shown in
Listing 417) The prototype implementation will directly invoke method calls of
agent instances to simplify IF checks by Jif/Joana as seen in Figure 8. The
deployment version utilizes the platform specific API to route the messages to
the actual, deployed app on the mobile device or a service on the internet, as
seen in Figure 9. Each message is being en- and decoded with JSON.
Listing 4: Wrapper API for sending messages
/∗∗
2 ∗ Sends a message to an agent
∗
4 ∗ @param message The message to send
∗ @param agent The agent which w i l l r e c e i v e the message
6 ∗ @return The response
∗/
8 public Message send ( f ina l Message message , Agent agent ) ;
The communication with IFlow services is implemented as HTTP requests
to appropriate service URLs as provided by Java EE, managed by the wrapper.
17Full API of the current version of the wrapper is shown in Appendix C
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Figure 9: Platform-specific application communication for deployment
The communication between Android apps can be realized in a number of ways;
for one, Android apps can provide external interfaces as Content Providers,
however those are only used for data queries. The alternative is to implement
Android Broadcast Receivers, which can receive and react to system-wide mes-
sages; but broadcasting sensitive information to all applications on a mobile
device is not a secure way to handle user’s data. We therefore realize IFlow
application interfaces with Android Services, which is an optional component of
any Android application. Services can run in the background and receive mes-
sages from other applications via the asynchronous inter-application Android
messaging system with so-called Intents. Since IFlow currently only supports
synchronous communication, our wrapper is designed to handle the synchro-
nization of messages between IFlow applications.
Android implements sandboxing and a permission system for its applications
to remain secure. As already outlined, those security mechanisms are not enough
to protect user’s confidential data from information leaks. We therefore only
implicitly rely on the application sandboxing aspect of Android by assuming that
IFlow applications cannot communicate with or influence each other besides by
using shared resources (e.g. SD card). Android permission play no role in our
IFC, and we thus only need to specify the minimal set of permissions required
by the generated application. To automate this process we will use Stowaway18,
which is able to analyze Android applications and generate such a set [10].
5 Conclusion and Outlook
We were successful in creating a model-driven approach for designing IF-secure
applications consisting of smartphone apps and webservices. We accomplished
this by creating concrete modeling guidelines and defining a mapping from an
abstract model to code skeletons, which in turn can be implemented manually
by the developer. Using already available automatic, language-based IF check-
ing tools (we evaluated both Jif and the preferable alternative, Joana) we are
able to show noninterference properties for the modeled application. By imple-
menting an abstraction library we will also be able to deploy the resulting code
to platforms like mobile devices and webservices. In order to verify IF properties
beyond simple noninterference we also defined a mapping between the abstract
mapping and a formal model, which can be used with the interactive verifier
KIV [4]. We will present achieved results in this field in an upcoming technical
report.
18Stowaway: A static analysis tool and permission map for identifying permission use in
Android applications, http://www.android-permissions.org/
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(a) Travel Planner: Creating appointment (b) Travel Planner: Selecting flight offer
Figure 10: Screenshots of the Android application “Travel Planner”
We evaluated our approach with the case study “Travel Planner” by creating
an abstract model of the application and writing code skeletons based on this
model. We also verified a simple noninterference property for this application
using Jif and Joana. Automatic model to code transformations are work in
progress, as is a full implementation of the abstraction wrapper library. We also
implemented full, runnable Android and Java EE service code for the extended
version of our case study, which includes a calendar application and hotel book-
ing using the current implementation of the wrapper (application screenshots
are shown in 10(a) and 10(b)).
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A Travel Planner UML Model
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B Travel Planner Agent Skeleton Code
Listing 5: TravelPlanner.java
1 package t r a v e l p l a n n e r ;
3 public class TravelPlanner extends Agent {
5 private stat ic TravelPlanner i n s t ance ;
7 public stat ic TravelPlanner ge t In s tance ( ) {
i f ( i n s t ance == null )
9 i n s t ance = new TravelPlanner ( ) ;
return i n s t ance ;
11 }
13 stat ic private U s e r I n t e r f a c e u i = new U s e r I n t e r f a c e ( ) ;
stat ic private TravelAgency travelAgency ;
15 stat ic private CreditCardCenter ccc ;
17 public TravelPlanner ( ) {
ccc = CreditCardCenter . g e t In s tance ( ) ;
19 travelAgency = TravelAgency . g e t In s tance ( ) ;
}
21
public void s t a r t ( ) {
23 // Ge tF l i gh tO f f e r s
RetInput inmsg = ui . getInputRequestData ( ) ;
25 RequestData requestData = ( RequestData ) inmsg . input ;
Re tF l i gh tOf f e r s inmsg2 = travelAgency . g e t F l i g h t O f f e r s (new
GetF l i ghtOf f e r s ( requestData ) ) ;
27 L i s t O f F l i g h t O f f e r f l i g h t O f f e r s = inmsg2 . f l i g h t O f f e r s ;
29 // ChooseFl ight
R e t S i n g l e S e l e c t i o n inmsg3 = ui . s e l ec tOne (new G e t S i n g l e S e l e c t i o n
( f l i g h t O f f e r s ) ) ;
31 F l i g h t O f f e r f l i g h t O f f e r = ( F l i g h t O f f e r ) inmsg3 . s e l e c t i o n ;
33 // ReleaseCCDDetails
Declass i f iedCCD inmsg4 = ccc . releaseCCD (new ReleaseCCD (
f l i g h t O f f e r . a i r l i n e ) ) ;
35 CreditCardData c c d d e c l = inmsg4 . ccd ;
37 // BookFl ight
A i r l i n e a i r l i n e = f l i g h t O f f e r . a i r l i n e ;
39 OK inmsg5 = a i r l i n e . bookFl ightOf f e r (new BookFl ightOf fer (
f l i g h t O f f e r . id , c c d d e c l ) ) ;
OK insmg6 = a i r l i n e . confirmBooking (new ConfirmBooking (
f l i g h t O f f e r . id ) ) ;
41 }
43 }
Listing 6: TravelAgency.java
1 package t r a v e l p l a n n e r ;
3 public class TravelAgency extends Agent {
5 private stat ic TravelAgency in s t ance ;
7 stat ic private A i r l i n e a i r l i n e ;
26
9 public stat ic TravelAgency ge t In s tance ( ) {
i f ( i n s t ance == null )
11 in s t ance = new TravelAgency ( ) ;
return i n s t ance ;
13 }
15 public TravelAgency ( ) {
a i r l i n e = A i r l i n e . g e t In s tance ( ) ;
17 }
19 /∗∗
∗ GetF l i gh tO f f e r s message hand l ing
21 ∗
∗/
23 public RetF l i gh tOf f e r s
g e t F l i g h t O f f e r s (
25 GetF l i gh tOf f e r s inmsg ) {
RequestData requestData = inmsg . requestData ;
27 RetF l i gh tOf f e r s inmsg2 = a i r l i n e . g e t F l i g h t O f f e r s (new
GetF l i ghtOf f e r s ( requestData ) ) ;
L i s t O f F l i g h t O f f e r f l i g h t O f f e r s = inmsg2 . f l i g h t O f f e r s ;
29 return new RetF l i gh tOf f e r s ( f l i g h t O f f e r s ) ;
}
31
33 public OK payComission ( PayComission inmsg ) {
int id = inmsg . id ;
35 return new OK( ) ;
}
37 }
Listing 7: CreditCardCenter.java
1 package t r a v e l p l a n n e r ;
3 public class CreditCardCenter extends Agent{
5 private stat ic CreditCardCenter i n s t ance ;
7 public stat ic CreditCardCenter ge t In s tance ( ) {
i f ( i n s t ance == null )
9 i n s t ance = new CreditCardCenter ( ) ;
return i n s t ance ;
11 }
13 private CreditCardData ccd = new CreditCardData ( ) ;
private U s e r I n t e r f a c e u i = new U s e r I n t e r f a c e ( ) ;
15
17 public CreditCardData getCcd ( ) {
return ccd ;
19 }
21 /∗∗
∗ ReleaseCCD message hand l ing
23 ∗
∗/
25 public Declass i f iedCCD releaseCCD ( ReleaseCCD inmsg ) {
Agent a i r l i n e = inmsg . r e c e i v e r ;
27 RetConfirmation inmsg2 = ui . con f i rmRelease (new ConfirmRelease (
ccd , a i r l i n e ) ) ;
27
CreditCardData c c d d e c l = D e c l a s s i f y . d e c l a s s i f y ( ccd ) ;
29 return new Declass i f iedCCD ( c c d d e c l ) ;
}
31
}
Listing 8: Airline.java
package t r a v e l p l a n n e r ;
2
import java . u t i l . ArrayList ;
4 import java . u t i l . L i s t ;
6 public class A i r l i n e extends Agent {
8 private stat ic A i r l i n e i n s t ance ;
public stat ic TravelAgency ta ;
10
public stat ic A i r l i n e ge t In s tance ( ) {
12 i f ( i n s t ance == null )
i n s t ance = new A i r l i n e ( ) ;
14 return i n s t ance ;
}
16
private L i s t f l i g h t O f f e r s = new ArrayList ( ) ;
18
public A i r l i n e ( ) {
20 F l i g h t O f f e r f o = new F l i g h t O f f e r ( this , 1) ;
try{
22 f l i g h t O f f e r s . add ( fo ) ;
}
24 catch ( Nul lPo interExcept ion e ) {}
catch ( ClassCastExcept ion e ) {}
26 catch ( I l l ega lArgumentExcept ion e ) {}
28 ta = TravelAgency . g e t In s tance ( ) ;
}
30
/∗∗
32 ∗ GetF l i gh tO f f e r s message hand l ing
∗
34 ∗/
public RetF l i gh tOf f e r s
36 g e t F l i g h t O f f e r s (
GetF l i gh tOf f e r s inmsg ) {
38 RequestData requestData = inmsg . requestData ;
L i s t O f F l i g h t O f f e r f i l t e r e d F l i g h t O f f e r s = Manual . f i l t e r O f f e r s (
requestData , f l i g h t O f f e r s ) ;
40 return new RetF l i gh tOf f e r s ( f i l t e r e d F l i g h t O f f e r s ) ;
}
42
/∗∗
44 ∗ BookFl igh tOf fer message hand l ing
∗
46 ∗/
public OK
48 bookFl ightOf f e r (
BookFl ightOf fer inmsg ) {
50 int id = inmsg . id ;
CreditCardData c c d d e c l = inmsg . ccd ;
52 Manual . processBooking ( id , c c d d e c l ) ;
return new OK( ) ;
28
54 }
56 /∗∗
∗ ConfirmBooking message hand l ing
58 ∗
∗/
60 public OK confirmBooking ( ConfirmBooking confirmBooking ) {
int id = confirmBooking . id ;
62 OK inmsg2 = ta . payComission (new PayComission ( id ) ) ;
return new OK( ) ;
64 }
66
}
29
C Wrapper API
Listing 9: Interface API for agent communication
1 public interface CommunicationService {
3 /∗∗
∗ Sends a message to an agent
5 ∗
∗ @param message The message to send
7 ∗ @param agent The agent , t ha t w i l l r e c e i v e the message
∗ @return The response
9 ∗/
public abstract Message send ( f ina l Message message , Agent agent ) ;
11
}
Listing 10: Interface API for database interaction
2 public interface DatabaseServ ice {
4 /∗∗
∗ Closes the connect ion to the database
6 ∗/
public abstract void c l o s e ( ) ;
8
/∗∗
10 ∗ Adds an o b j e c t to the database
∗
12 ∗ @param objectToSave The o b j e c t to add
∗ @return The primary key id , generated by the SQLite
Database
14 ∗/
public abstract long addObject ( Object objectToSave ) ;
16
/∗∗
18 ∗ Returns a cursor , t ha t has the informat ion o f the quer ied
database
∗ The informat ion o f the o b j e c t re f e renced by the o b j e c t I d
20 ∗ The Cursor and t h e r e a f t e r the Database have to be c l o s ed
manually a f t e r usage
∗ usage
22 ∗
∗ @param ob j e c t I d The id o f the o b j e c t to query
24 ∗ @param objectToQuery The ob j t ha t r e f e r ence s the t a b l e to
query
∗ @return The cursor with the informat ion
26 ∗/
public abstract Cursor queryDatabase ( int ob jec t Id , Class
objectClassToQuery ) ;
28
/∗∗
30 ∗ Returns a cursor with a l l o b j e c t s , t ha t are saved in the db
∗ Discouraged , because query i s on a l l columns
32 ∗ @param objectToQuery The ob j ec t , o f which t a b l e to query
∗ @return A cursor with a l l o b j e c t s
34 ∗/
public abstract Cursor queryForAl l ( Class objectClassToQuery ) ;
36
/∗∗
30
38 ∗ Returns a l l o b j e c t s from the database t ha t f i t to the
s p e c i f i e d c l a s s
∗
40 ∗ @param objectClassToQuery The c la s s , t ha t s p e c i f i e s the t a b l e
to query
∗ @return An ArrayList conta in ing a l l o b j e c t s o f the
t a b l e
42 ∗/
public abstract ArrayList<Object> queryForAl lObjects (
44 Class objectClassToQuery ) ;
46 /∗∗
∗ Returns a cursor with the o b j e c t s from the database , t ha t
match the s e l e c t i o n
48 ∗ @param objectToQuery The ob j ec t , o f which t a b l e to query
∗ @param s e l e c t i o n A s e l e c t i o n s t r ing , formatted as an sq l−
where−c l ause wi thout the ’ where ’
50 ∗ @param se l e c t i onArg s S p e c i f i e s the ’? ’ in the s e l e c t i o n
argument f o r the query
∗ @return A cursor with the s e l e c t e d o b j e c t s
52 ∗/
public abstract Cursor queryWithSe lect ion ( Class
objectClassToQuery ,
54 St r ing s e l e c t i o n , S t r ing [ ] s e l e c t i o n A r g s ) ;
56 /∗∗
∗ Returns the cursor conta in ing the o b j e c t with the g iven id
58 ∗ Cursor and connect ion have to be c l o s ed a f t e r usage
∗
60 ∗ @param ob j e c t I d The id , t ha t r e f e r ence s the database entry
∗ @param tableName The name of the t a b l e
62 ∗ @return A cursor conta in ing the o b j e c t
∗/
64 public abstract Cursor queryDatabase ( long ob jec t Id , S t r ing
tableName ) ;
66 /∗∗
∗ Queries the database and re turns the o b j e c t wi th the g iven id
68 ∗ Only works i f a l l o b j e c t s have d e f a u l t cons t ruc tor
∗
70 ∗ @param ob j e c t I d The id o f the quer ied o b j e c t
∗ @param className The f u l l y c l a s s i f i e d name of the c l a s s to
query
72 ∗ @return The returned o b j e c t
∗/
74 public abstract Object query ( long ob jec t Id , Class o b j e c t C l a s s ) ;
76 /∗∗
∗ Returns a l i s t o b j e c t o f the g iven c l a s s and re f e renced by the
id o f the o b j e c t having the
78 ∗ l i s t as f i e l d
∗
80 ∗ @param l i s tTypeC la s s The c l a s s o f the l i s t
∗ @param objectOfTheReferenceId The id o f the o b j e c t
r e f e r enc ing the l i s t
82 ∗ @return The l i s t o b j e c t
∗/
84 public abstract Object queryDatabaseForList ( Class<?>
l i s tTypeClas s ,
long objectOfTheReferenceId , S t r ing paramType ) ;
86
/∗∗
31
88 ∗ Updates the o b j e c t in the database by d e l e t i n g i t and adding
i t new
∗
90 ∗ @param objectToUpdate The o b j e c t to update
∗ @return True , i f update was s u c c e s s f u l
92 ∗ False , in s t ead
∗/
94 public abstract boolean updateObject ( Object objectToUpdate ) ;
96 /∗∗
∗ Dele te an o b j e c t from the database
98 ∗
∗ @param objec tToDe le te the o b j e c t to be d e l e t e d from the
database
100 ∗ @return true , i f the d e l e t i o n was s u c c e s s f u l
∗ f a l s e , o therwi se
102 ∗/
public abstract boolean de l e t eOb jec t ( Object objectToDelete ) ;
104
/∗∗
106 ∗ Creates a t a b l e f o r the g iven ob j ec t , i f i t does not a l ready
e x i s t
∗
108 ∗ @param objectToSave The o b j e c t f o r which a t a b l e i s needed
∗/
110 public abstract void c r ea t eTab l e I fNotEx i s t s ( Object objectToSave ) ;
112 }
32
